 Even if both scholars had spoken German, it would hardly have been possible for me to complete such a detailed protocol, especially of the scholarly exchanges. Therefore, someone had to add to the text. This would be acceptable only if Hisamatsu were to have done so. If you should find the original of the ‘protocol’ in the Jung Archive [where I had been directed by Jaffé to find the original German text—S.M.] I would be delighted to be able to consult it.

It should be noted that Jaffé seemed to forget that Tsujimura had been present as a translator. The protocol, as a result, became all the more important. I later obtained permission from Lorenz Jung to make a copy of the document, the use of which was allowed at the time only for reasons of ‘personal study and research.’ Upon securing the material, I immediately met with Jaffé again, and went over the document with her, comparing her transcription with the odd English text at our disposal. In further research I have since performed and published in Japan, I counted and commented on approximately fifty discrepancies between the two texts. (See my entry in Annual Report from the Institute for Zen Studies, vol. 19, 1993.) In the meantime, permission was finally obtained to publish a translation of the German protocol I had prepared in the course of my research. The following, therefore, is the first English translation to be published of Jaffé’s original German transcription of the 1958 conversation between Shin’ichi Hisamatsu and Carl Gustav Jung.

16 May 1958

SHIN’ICHI HISAMATSU: In the United States I witnessed the great spread of psychoanalysis and talked about it with many scholars. I am very glad to speak today with the founder of psychoanalysis. I would like to hear your thoughts on the state of psychoanalysis today.1

CARL G. JUNG: I would prefer to know your view first, so that I may understand the nature of the question. Eastern language is very different from Western conceptual language. In India, I had many conversations with philosophers and came to realize that I always need to clarify the question first; so as to know what my Eastern partner is thinking. If I assume that I know what he thinks, everything will be misconstrued.

SH: As I am no specialist in psychoanalysis, I would first like to understand its essential position, in order to then compare it with Zen.

CGJ: That is possible, but you must bear in mind that Zen is a philosophy and that I am a psychologist.

SH: In a sense, one might say that Zen is a philosophy, but it is very different from ordinary philosophy, which depends on human intellectual activity. One might therefore say that Zen is no philosophy. Zen is a philosophy and at the same time a religion, but no ordinary religion. It is ‘religion and philosophy.’
CGJ: I must pose these questions in order to hear what you think, so that I can then direct my questions accordingly. You want to know what I think psychologically of the task that Zen poses for us. The task is in both cases—Zen and psychology—the same. Zen is concerned with how we deal with *wu-hsin*, no-mind.

SH: To date there have been many interpretations of *wu-hsin*.

CGJ: I mean the unconscious by it.

SH: It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to find a true and strict definition for the term from the standpoint of Zen. This is extremely important. I would like to hear your thoughts on the matter.\(^2\)

CGJ: It is the unknown that affects me psychologically, the unknown that disturbs or influences me, whether positively or negatively. Thus I notice that it exists, but I don’t know what it is.

SH: Is this ‘unknown’ something different from the unconscious? From the collective unconscious?

CGJ: The unknown disturbs or influences me in certain forms. Otherwise I could not speak of it. Sometimes I sense that a personal memory is bothering me, or exerting an influence on me; other times I have dreams, ideas, or fantasies that do not have a personal origin. Their source is not the subjective; rather they have a universal quality. For example, the image I have of my father is a personal image. But when this image possesses a religious quality, it is no longer solely connected to the personal realm.

SH: Is the non-personal unconscious a fundamental unconscious? In other words, is the non-personal unconscious what you call the collective unconscious? Is this the most fundamental? Or perhaps just relatively more fundamental?\(^3\)

CGJ: The personal unconscious develops in the course of life, for example through experiences, the memory of which I repress. The other, the collective, is something instinctually innate and universally human. My collective unconscious is the same as yours, even though you were born in Japan and I here in Europe. SH: Does the collective unconscious involve something common to all persons or something that is beyond the personal?

CGJ: One can only say that the collective unconscious is the commonality of all instinctive reactions found among all human beings. The possibility of our speaking with each other intellectually rests on our sharing a common foundation. Otherwise, we would be so different as to understand nothing.

SH: Fairy tales speak of various sufferings and joys. Do these all emerge from the collective unconscious?
CGJ: If, for example, you study a very primitive person with limited consciousness or, let’s say, if you study a child—a child who cannot yet even say ‘I’—you find that the child is still in the general mental state of all children, or of all people before they achieve consciousness. Consciousness has developed through the course of history; it is a common experience. Ontogeny repeats phylogeny. In the child, consciousness develops out of a collective unconscious state. Emotional life, worries, joys, sufferings, hate, love, these are already present before consciousness proper develops. You see this in animals as well. It is connected with the essence of the unconscious. There are instinctive excitements observable in animals which are connected with the essence of the unconscious. Perhaps one could say that these are klesas—namely, properties or symptoms of the unconscious.

SH: From our viewpoint, klesas belong to the sphere of consciousness.

CGJ: Of course, consciousness is necessary, otherwise we could not establish that such things exist. But the question for us is: is it consciousness that creates the klesas? The answer is no; consciousness is their victim. Before consciousness, passions already exist. One cannot ask a raging animal whether it is raging. The animal is totally at the mercy of its rage.

SH: Klesas are usually thought to belong to consciousness, but how is this sphere of consciousness related to the unconscious?

CGJ: How is the unconscious related to consciousness? I really have no definite answer. But for us they are related: we see from experience that consciousness develops out of the unconscious. We can observe this in children, in primitive people and so on. And I see it as a physician. If I have to treat a person in the grip of the unconscious, the unconscious is like a landscape at night, when nothing of the mountains and lakes and woods is visible. Then, if a fire starts someplace, you can suddenly see all that’s there—the lakes, the woods, and so on. That is consciousness.

SH: Which then is our real self, our real, our putative ‘I’: the unconscious or consciousness?

CGJ: Consciousness refers to itself as ‘I.’ The self is no mere ‘I.’ The self is the whole personality—you as a totality—consisting of consciousness and the unconscious. This is the whole, or the self, but I know only consciousness; the unconscious remains unknown to me.

SH: In your view, the self is a totality. This prompts the following question: Is I-consciousness different from self-consciousness?

CGJ: In ordinary usage, one says self-consciousness, but that only means I-consciousness, psychologically speaking. The self is unknown
because it indeed designates the whole of the person, both conscious and unconscious. The conscious person you are is known to you, but the unconscious person you are is unknown to you. The human self is beyond description, because it is only one-third, or perhaps two-thirds, in the realm of experience, and that part belongs to the ‘I.’ That which is unknown, however, does not encompass the self. The vernacular expression ‘self-consciousness’ translates psychologically as I-consciousness. The self is much more than the ‘I.’

SH: So the self is unknown?
CGJ: Perhaps only half of it is known, and that is the ‘I,’ the half of the self.
SH: Is the way the self is unknown the same as the way that the unconscious is unknown?
CGJ: It is practically the same. I do not know what is within the unconscious, I am not conscious of it.
SH: Is what we call ‘I’ in ordinary life the same ‘I’ that experiences so many different emotions? The ordinary ‘I’ belongs to the sphere of consciousness. How is it related to the original unknown self? What place does the ‘I’ have in the whole personality?
CGJ: The ‘I’ is like a light in the darkness of night.
SH: In illness, a patient experiences many deep sufferings, and therapy perhaps consists of liberating the suffering patient from them. He is brought to a state of non-suffering. If this liberation is the nature of psychotherapy, how is therapy related to the fundamental unconscious?
CGJ: If the illness is caused by things that are unconscious, then there is the possibility of healing by making these causes conscious. The causes do not always have to lie in the unconscious, however. There are cases in which the symptoms point to psychic causes. For example, there was a man who lost his consciousness, so to speak, and became only half conscious. It was as if he had lost his good judgment. The reason for this was that the child to whom his wife had given birth was not his own child. While he was not conscious of this fact, it had nonetheless darkened his consciousness. He then chased after an old love of his, but this was only because he was always living in unawareness. He was unconscious of what was causing his suffering, and the therapy consisted in telling him that his wife had been unfaithful.
SH: What will become of this man when he has clearly recognized that the child is not his own? It could be that after learning the truth he becomes afflicted with another suffering. Does psychotherapy consist of making conscious the causes of suffering?
CGJ: In his case, yes, but not always. For example, there are other cases in which the causes are well known, in which a person already knows that a bad relationship with his father or mother is the cause of his suffering. Anybody can know as much. What everybody cannot know is the kind of consequences for the patient’s character that result from the relationship. Nor do they know what kind of attitude he is now to have toward these consequences. Most patients say repeatedly, ‘Father and mother are to blame for my illness,’ but the real question is: How can I treat the patient so that he becomes able to cope with his experience? While the father’s and the mother’s responsibility may be a causal factor, when all is said and done, therapy hinges on the final question: What kind of meaning does my life have?

SH: Ordinary life has many kinds of suffering. Psychotherapy consists of liberation from suffering. What sort of changes in the sphere of the unconscious correspond to this liberation?

CGJ: This is the question of conscious attitude. In states of psychological suffering, it is important how I myself relate to a certain state, what kind of attitude I have. Let’s say I am unhappy or sad because of something that’s happened. If I think, ‘How horrible that something like this has happened,’ and cannot accept it, then I’ll only suffer more. Each day has its own troubles, and the sun cannot always shine. Sometimes it rains or snows. If a person is able to adopt the attitude that both good and bad are part of life, that person will suffer less. With an objective attitude, he or she can find a way to be released from morbid neurotic suffering. If he or she can say ‘yes’ to the suffering and accept it, the pain is suddenly diminished.

SH: A universal suffering is the fear of death. How can this suffering be treated by psychotherapy?

CGJ: There is no general rule or method, but only individual cases. People fear death for many different reasons. The course of therapy depends upon the reasons for this death anxiety. My anxiety of death is quite different from anxiety in a young, healthy man. Why does he fear death? There may be no apparent reason and yet he fears it. So the situations are quite different. Therefore, there is no general course of therapy. We must always consider the individual case. Why is an old man anxious about death? Why is a young man anxious about death? The two must be dealt with quite differently.

SH: I only mention the fear of death as an example, because death is unavoidable. But people suffer in many, many ways. We must almost always live in suffering. I want to ask you whether or not it
is possible, within the framework of psychotherapy, for a person to
disengage from all these various sufferings in one fell swoop.

CGJ: Are you asking whether there exists a method by which suffering is
healed?

SH: Yes. Is there no generally valid remedy for it?

CGJ: Are you asking whether there is a method through which one could
spare a person suffering?

SH: Yes. Can psychotherapy liberate us from suffering in one fell swoop?

CGJ: Liberate us from suffering? One tries to reduce suffering, yet some
suffering is always present. There would be nothing beautiful if the
beautiful were not in contrast with ugliness or suffering. The
German philosopher Schopenhauer once said: ‘Happiness is the
cessation of suffering.’ We need suffering. Otherwise, life would
no longer be interesting. Psychotherapy must not disturb the
problem of suffering too much in people. Otherwise, people would
become dissatisfied.

SH: Suffering is, in a sense, necessary for life. You are right. Nevertheless,
we have a genuine wish to be liberated from it.

CGJ: Of course, if there is too much of it! The physician strives to reduce
suffering, not to put an end to it.

SH: In the case of physical illness, the physician tries to release the
patient from it and to eliminate sickness from the human world. Is
this not also true of mental illness?

CGJ: Of course!

SH: The great messengers of religious truth—Christ, for example—have said
that all humans suffer a common lot: the suffering of
death, or of original sin. Their intention was to liberate humans
from this fundamental suffering. Is it possible to think that such a
great liberation could be realized in psychotherapy?

CGJ: This is not inconceivable, if you regard the problem not as a
personal illness, but as an impersonal manifestation of evil. The
concern of psychotherapy is in many cases to make patients
conscious, through insight, of the nidana chain, of the unnecessary
suffering fostered by lust, desire, and passion. Passion ties us up,
but through insight we are made free. The goal in psychotherapy
is exactly the same as in Buddhism.

SH: The essential issue in this liberation is: How does one reach a
fundamental self, one that is no longer captivated by the ten
thousand things? How to get there, that is the problem. Is it
necessary to liberate oneself from the collective unconscious as well,
or from the conditions it imposes on us?

CGJ: If someone is caught in the ten thousand things, it is because that
person is also caught in the collective unconscious. A person is
liberated only when freed from both. One person may be driven more by the unconscious and another by things. One has to take the person to the point where he is free from the compulsion to either run after things or be driven by the unconscious. What is needed for both compulsions is basically the same: nirdvandva.\(^7\)

SH: From what you have said about the collective unconscious, might I infer that one can be liberated from it?

CGJ: Yes!\(^8\)

SH: What we in Buddhism, and especially in Zen, usually call the ‘common self’ corresponds exactly to what you call the ‘collective unconscious.’ Only through liberation from the collective unconscious, namely, the common self, the authentic self emerge.\(^9\)

CGJ: This self of which you speak corresponds, for example, to the klesas in the \textit{Yoga Sutra}. My concept of self corresponds, however, to the notions of \textit{atman} or \textit{pursha}. This personal \textit{atman} corresponds to the self insofar as it is at the same time the suprapersonal \textit{atman}. In other words, ‘my self’ is at the same time ‘the self’. In my language, the self is the counterpart to the ‘I.’ What you call the self is what I would call the ‘I.’ What I call the self is the whole, the \textit{atman}.

SH: The authentic self corresponds to the \textit{atman}. In the common understanding \textit{atman} still retains a faint trace of substance, but that is not yet what I call the true self. The true self has neither substance nor form.\(^10\)

CGJ: So when I compare the self with \textit{atman}, my comparison is an obviously incorrect one. They are incommensurable because the Eastern way of thinking is different from my way of thinking. I can say that the self both exists and does not exist, because I really can say nothing about it. It is greater than the ‘I.’ The ‘I’ can only say: This is the way it seems to me. If one were to say that atman either has or does not have substance, I can only acknowledge what the person says—for I do not know what the true \textit{atman} really is. I only know what people say about it. I can only say of it: ‘It is so’ and, at the same time, ‘It is not so.’

SH: Unlike the ordinary \textit{atman}, the true self of Zen has neither form nor substance. It has no form, mental or physical.

CGJ: I cannot know what I don’t know. I cannot be conscious of whether the self has attributes or not, because I am unconscious of the self. The whole human person is both conscious and unconscious. I only know that I may possess a certain set of attributes. What you say [concerning the ordinary \textit{atman} and the true self of Zen—S.M.] is possible, but I don’t know if that’s really the case. I can, of course, make assertions. I can state metaphysical matters until I am blue in the face but, fundamentally, I don’t know.\(^11\)
SH: The true self is without form and substance, and is therefore never bound by the ten thousand things. That is the essence of religious liberation. This is also the religious character of Zen, with its insight into the value of transcending the passions and becoming the formless self. That is why I said at the beginning of our conversation that Zen is both philosophy and religion.

Professor Hisamatsu thanks Dr Jung for having found, together with him, the connection between the unconscious and what we have called ‘the true self.’ He says that the connection has become very clear to him. He then proceeds to explain the true self further by using the metaphor of waves on water.

Notes

1 Jaffé’s note: C. C. Jung’s psychology is called analytical psychology, to distinguish it from Freud’s psychoanalysis.

2 Hisamatsu does not use the Chinese word wu-hsin, but rather its Japanese phonetic transcription, mu-shin. Hsin, meaning the mind or heart, is a Chinese word that decisively characterizes the whole of Chinese Buddhism including Zen. Wu, denoting nothingness, is not to be taken as a logical negation like in the Western sense, so wu-hsin is not necessarily the negation of hsin. In some Zen texts they are identical with each other, and, moreover, hsin is even equated with the Buddha. So Chinese Buddhism may be the philosophy of the mind, or a radical psychology. Wu-hsin appears already in a title of a Zen text as a collection of sayings by Bodhi Dharma, the first patriarch of Chinese Zen Buddhism: Wu-hsin-lun, ‘A Discourse on No-Mind.’ Like many other Buddhist terms, the word has settled into the Japanese language, albeit with some variation in meaning. In the Japanese version of the protocol, Jung’s statement that he means the unconscious by wu-hsin is given as a note by Jaffé.

3 The word ‘fundamental’ (ursprünglich in Jaffé’s protocol) is my translation of both komponenteki and kongenteiki in the Japanese translation—terms which might be more exactly rendered ‘original’ or ‘radical’ because kom or kon refers to root. What Hisamatsu means to refer to is something metaphysical, and not genetically primal—though he would deny metaphysics in the Western sense. His meaning may be close to the German prefix ur-, as in Goethe’s concepts of Urpflanz, Urphanomen and so on, because it is at once both metaphysical and accessible to experience. It is with some reservation, then, that I adopt the English term ‘fundamental’ instead of ‘original.’ It is essential in this context to keep in mind Hisamatsu’s lack of familiarity with depth psychology. He speaks of ‘the fundamental unconscious’ in his own Zen sense of wu-hsin—and not in any psychological sense. Thus, even if the term ‘fundamental’ were replaced by words like ‘original’ or ‘primal,’ it is only the translator who grapples with such nuances of meaning and sophistication. Hisamatsu only uses the word ‘unconscious’ in this dialogue with Jung; otherwise, he, like D. T. Suzuki, would never speak of it. In the Japanese text, in fact, the word ‘unconscious’ is given in quotes, perhaps to suggest Hisamatsu’s particular use and understanding of it.

4 Jung here refers to Ernst Heckel’s famous biological thesis. The earlier English version of the conversation, based upon the Japanese translation, reveals that the Japanese
translator was unaware of this. In that earlier version, ‘ontogeny’ and ‘phylogeny’ were respectively mistranslated as ‘the development of the individual’ and ‘the development of psyche in history.’

5 Since the days of Strachey’s translation of Freud, the German term *das Ich* is usually rendered ‘the ego’ in the psychological literature. But throughout the conversation, both Hisamatsu and Jung seem to refer to an everyday—rather than a technical—understanding of the term, along the lines of what Bruno Bettelheim, in his book *Freud and Man’s Soul*, takes to be Freud’s own original intent. Therefore, I consistently use ‘I’ instead of ‘the ego’ as the translation of *das Ich*. I am grateful to Jan Middeldorff for his insistence on this point.

6 The Buddha is mentioned along with Christ in Tsujimura’s translation.

7 Sanskrit word meaning ‘freedom from opposites,’ but different from *nirvana*. *Nirdvandva* refers to an idea in which dualism is presupposed and at the same time overcome. It is no wonder that Jung adopted this word, as it fits well with his mode of thinking which is expressed, for example, in his key concept of the ‘transcendent function’—namely, an attitude or a capacity to sustain the tension of opposites, from which a reconciling symbol can then emerge from the depths of the mind. The word *nirvana*, on the contrary, originally meaning ‘the extinction of fire,’ suggests an absolute transcendence or denial of dualism to nothingness—reflecting a mode of thinking which is foreign to Jung.

8 Hisamatsu’s immediately preceding question is, in my opinion, the gravitational center of the entire conversation, comparable with a critical confrontation between a Zen master and his disciple in Zen mondo (question and answer). We are told, in fact, in Hisamatsu’s commentary to the Japanese version of the translation appearing in vol. 1 of his *Complete Works* that both he and Tsujimura found Jung’s ‘Yes!’ very unexpected. Unfortunately, however, we don’t know what kind of ‘yes’ it was. Was Jung’s reply a heartily felt affirmation, an expression of exasperation, or a ‘yes’ which was somehow forced from his mind, perhaps even against his will, by Hisamatsu’s penetrating and somewhat intrusive questioning? Personally, I believe the latter was the case, and suspect that this was one of the reasons why Jung refused to have the conversation published in *Psychologia*.

9 Tsujimura’s Japanese version includes this clarification of what is meant by the ‘authentic self’: ‘That is the true self, or *doku-datsu mu-e*: namely, the self that is alone,
independent, and detached.’ The source of doku-datsu mu-e is The Record of Lin-chi, where not doku-datsu mu-e but the expressions doku-datsu and fu-e, not mu-e, appear separately. Mu implies a negation, while e means ‘dependence.’ Doku and datsu mean respectively ‘alone’ and ‘detached.’ Lin-chi (–867) is reported to have said: ‘The Buddha is born from mu-e.’ After a famous provocation of killing the Buddha and the Zen patriarchs, he scolds his disciples: ‘You don’t see yet from where a person emerges who is doku-datsu.’ Hisamatsu seems to have coined the expression doku-datsu mu-e by combining doku-datsu and mu-e.

On the matter of ‘authentic self,’ the German das eigentliche Selbst cited in the protocol is perhaps Tsujimura’s translation of Hisamatsu’s term honrai-no-jiko. Eigentliche clearly suggests that Tsujimura—a student of Martin Heidegger—interprets honrai-no-jiko in the Heideggerian sense. Heidegger’s concept of Eigentlichkeit, derived from his Being and Time, is usually translated honrai-sei into Japanese. The philosophers of the Kyoto School are generally sympathetic to Heidegger, whom Hisamatsu also met. (Their conversation, in fact, is recorded in vol. I of Hisamatsu’s Collected Works. It is altogether free of the many tensions evidenced in Hisamatsu’s conversation with Jung.) Because Eigentlichkeit is translated as ‘authenticity’ in English versions of Being and Time, I have opted to translate das eigentliche Selbst as ‘the authentic self.’

To refer to something ultimate, or metaphysical, Hisamatsu uses in the Japanese version three different adjectival phrases: honrai-no, shinjitsu-no (or shin-no) and kongenteki, which I have rendered respectively as ‘authentic,’ ‘true’ and ‘fundamental.’ Though originally Chinese terms, they have been used by modern Japanese philosophers to translate Western philosophical terms into Japanese. Hisamatsu seems to use the three adjectives without any clear differentiation among them in his terminology. Thus, while Hisamatsu elsewhere speaks of ‘the fundamental unconscious’ in the Zen sense of wu-hsin (see note 3), we have reason to suspect that his use of terms like ‘authentic’ or ‘true’ refers to this same basic understanding.

Still, in this very passage Hisamatsu clearly states that ‘the authentic self that corresponds to the atman is not yet what I call the true self!’ I realize that such a statement seems in flagrant contradiction to the claim that ‘true,’ ‘authentic,’ and ‘fundamental’ are all equivalent adjectives for Hisamatsu. In a sense, this passage reveals an inconsistency in the philosopher’s use and understanding of the words ‘the true self.’ It may be due to a logical dilemma intrinsic to Buddhist philosophy of which Hisamatsu was likely to be deeply aware, to the point of coining the concept of the ‘formless self.’

This discourse of self may sound contradictory to the Buddhist, especially Indian Buddhist basic tenet of non-self. But it can be regarded as the development of a philosophy elaborated in Chinese Buddhism, especially stimulated by the text Ta-ch’eng-ch’i-hsin-lun, A Treatise of the Mahayana Awakening Faith (see note 15), according to which ti, xiang and yong meaning ‘substance’, ‘forms’, and ‘function’ respectively, are fundamentally one and the same. So in Ch’uan-hsin-fa-yao, The Essence of the Mind Dharma Transmission, His-yün (–850), Lin-chi’s master, says that the mind is nothing but no-mind.

Finally, it is interesting to note that, in the Japanese text, this same passage reads: ‘The authentic self, insofar as semantics is concerned, corresponds to the atman.’ Hisamatsu was aware of how difficult, if not impossible, it is to explain the meaning of the true self with the Indian concept of atman. He never identified the authentic self with atman in the Hindu sense. In my view, he borrowed the Hindu concept to explain his own concept to Jung, who did not share the same spiritual background but seemed
to have some knowledge of Upanishad philosophy. Such a confusion is common
between people from different cultures trying to reach a common understanding.

Jung’s final two comments evidence his harsh criticism of Hisamatsu’s conviction,
which, in its resistance to any psychological investigation, resembles those Jung observed
throughout his life in clergy and believers. Basically, we can see Jung opposing his
psychological viewpoint to Hisamatsu’s ontology.

In this light, a freer translation of Jung’s response might read: ‘Professor Hisamatsu,
we must distinguish between your understanding of the true self of Zen—as one possible
archetypal image of the self—and the archetype of the self as such. You may well know
the self in your sense—be it fundamental, true or formless—but while I am sorry that
I do not, neither of us can know the self as such.’

Jung’s opening statement here is also quite perplexing, and warrants close attention.
Perhaps tautological in expressing his agnostic stance, the phrase ‘I cannot know what
I don’t know’ seems to turn Jung’s own understanding of the unconscious upside-down.

It is not characteristically Jungian, or true, that one cannot know what one does not
know. In the course of a lifetime, one can indeed come to know what one ignores at
given time. Conversely, it is Jung’s unequivocal contention that only the
unconscious is destined to remain forever unknown—despite one’s efforts to know it.
Thus, a phrase like ‘I don’t know what I cannot know’ somehow sounds more natural
and consistent in a Jungian context than the cited ‘I cannot know what I don’t know.’
We can perhaps assume that Jung’s odd remark reflects an implicit refusal to further
debate Hisamatsu’s religious and philosophical convictions.

Hisamatsu’s phrase ‘with its insight into the value of transcending the passions’ is not
present in the Japanese text. It was perhaps edited out by Hisamatsu himself or by
Tsujimura. In addition, the next phrase, ‘and becoming the formless self,’ is somewhat
different in the Japanese text, where it reads: ‘In short, becoming the formless self is the
nature of Zen.’

On the matter of the formless self (muso-no-jiko, in Japanese): As a Buddhist,
Hisamatsu does not regard the self as a metaphysical entity. This does not mean,
howerover, that he advocates nihilism. He presents a concept of the self that is not
metaphysical in the Western sense but, in a sense intrinsic to Buddhist philosophy,
formless. It is the Mahayana understanding of the self as bodhi (awakening) that
underscores, in fact, Hisamatsu’s religion or philosophy of awakening. But while
Hisamatsu’s central idea is basic to the very origins of Buddhism, his idea of the formless
self and other similar expressions (such as the fundamental, authentic, or true self) mark
—through his assimilation of Western philosophy—his unique contribution to the
development of modern Buddhism.

Hisamatsu’s remark ‘Zen is both philosophy and religion’ actually reads ‘Zen is both
philosophy and psychology’ in the German protocol. While this likely reflects an error
in typing, the substitution offers an interesting example of what Freud considered ‘the
psychopathology of everyday life’!

I am not sure whom the ‘we’ here refers to. Two answers are possible. One is, of course,
both Hisamatsu and Jung. Another is Hisamatsu himself, together with those who share
his position.

The metaphor of waves on water is originally found in the Lankavatara Sutra, a sutra
supposedly preached by the Buddha on Adam’s Peak in Ceylon. It later became the
source for the text Ta-ch’eng-ch’i-hsin-lun, ‘The Mahayana Faith Awakening,’ whose
original Sanskrit version by Asvagosha was lost but later recast through two Chinese
versions by Paramartha and by Siksananda. To illustrate the metaphor, I offer the following excerpt, taken from Hisamatsu’s own essay ‘The Characteristics of Oriental Nothingness’: ‘Waves are produced by the water but are never separated from the water. When they cease to be waves, they return to the water—their original source…While the water in the wave is one with the wave and not two, the water does not come into being and disappear, increase or decrease, according to the coming into being and disappearing of the wave. Although the water as wave comes into being and disappears, the water as water does not come into being and disappear. Thus even when changing into a thousand or ten thousand waves, the water as water is itself constant and unchanging. The Mind of “all is created by Alone-Mind” is like this water. The assertions of the Sixth Patriarch, Hui-neng, “Self-Nature, in its origin constant and without commotion, produces the ten thousand things,” and “All things are never separated from Self-Nature,” express just this creative feature of Mind.’ (Translated by Richard DeMartino, in collaboration with Jikal Fujiyoshi and Masao Abe.) See Philosophical Studies of Japan (1960).